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NOTES 
Legal Interpretation and a Constitutional Case: Home 
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell 
Charles A. Bieneman 
In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 1 the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act.2 
This was a striking result.3 Under the Act, mortgagors who found 
themselves unable to make their mortgage payments could tum to the 
state courts for an alteration of their payment schedule. 4 The law was 
passed in response to a wave of farm foreclosures brought on by the 
Great Depression.5 The law was also passed in the face of the U.S. 
Constitution, which provides that "No State shall ... pass any ... 
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "6 The Minnesota law 
impaired the obligation of mortgage contracts. 7 
The basic premise underlying Chief Justice Hughes' opinion for 
the Court was that a constitutional provision should be interpreted' 
both in the context of the entire Constitution and in the context of the 
social situation confronting the Court. 8 A major corollary to this 
premise is that a constitutional provision may mandate different re-
sults in similar cases arising at different points in history.9 Hughes 
believed that the words of a constitutional provision have little mean-
ing in the abstract. A provision's framing does not fix its meaning for 
all time; instead, a provision's meaning is fixed when a specific case 
arises requiring its application. Justice Sutherland, on the other hand, 
claimed in dissent that the meaning and application of a constitutional 
provision are distinct concepts.10 Thus, he thought that the framing of 
1. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
2. 1933 Minn. Laws 339. 
3. The result is all the more striking because it occurred before the Court's fabled "switch in 
time." See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 130 n.2 (11th ed. 1985) (describing the 
Court's abandonment of its Lochner-era judicial activism in favor of a more permissive attitude 
toward state regulation). 
4. For an explanation and history of mortgage moratoria, see Charles Bunn, The Impairment 
of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (1933). 
5. See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text. 
6. U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
7. See infra section II.A. Both parties and every judge who considered the case agreed that 
the Minnesota law impaired the obligation of contracts. See infra note 65. 
8. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425. Hughes' opinion is outlined in detail infra section I.A. 
9. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442. 
10. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 449 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
2534 
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the Constitution fixed the meaning of the Contracts Clause for all 
cases arising across time. 11 Accordingly, Sutherland viewed the clause 
as a strict prohibition against mortgage moratoria, which no circum-
stance could alleviate. 
The approaches of Hughes and Sutherland are but two extremes in 
constitutional interpretation. Though only two results were possible 
in the case - either the Act was constitutional or it was not - there 
are more than two methods by which an interpreter could reach those 
results. This Note explores possible ways of deciding Blaisdell, using 
the case as a vehicle for delimiting the boundaries of a positive consti-
tutional command. As a sort of empirical investigation of legal philos-
ophy, the Note examines how various interpretive theories affect an 
interpreter's approach to the case, and the results these theories might 
mandate. The Note's thesis is that Blaisdell was wrongly decided 
under any theory of interpretation.12 
After summarizing the Hughes and Sutherland opinions in Part I, 
the Note proceeds in Part II to discuss the application of three inter-
pretive methods to Blaisdell: textualism, originalism, and contextual-
ism. Part II concludes that all three methods mandate striking down 
the Minnesota law. Part III examines two schools of legal philosophy 
- positivism and natural law - to see how the case would be resolved 
under their respective conceptions of law. This Part questions 
whether either legal theory can justify the Court's result. Finally, Part 
IV uses legal realism to account for the Blaisdell decision. This Part 
argues that though realism accurately describes the Blaisdell decision, 
the theory normatively justifies the Court's opinion only if one agrees 
that the interpreter should be wholly unconstrained by positive law. 
Thus, the Note concludes that Blaisdell is an example of cases in 
which a court, striving to reach a desired result, ignored the law.13 
11. 290 U.S. at 449; see Edward S. Corwin, Moratorium Over Minnesota, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 
311, 316 (1934) (Sutherland "treats the Minnesota statute as if it had been enacted contempora-
neously with the Constitution; while [Hughes] treats 'the Constitution as contemporary with the 
Minnesota statute, that is, with today."). 
12. Though modem commentators have had little to say about Blaisdell, those who have 
mentioned the case have not done so favorably. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitali-
zation of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703, 735 (1984) (Blaisdell "contains some of 
the most misguided thinking on constitutional interpretation imaginable."); Robert C. Palmer, 
Obligations of Contracts: Intent and Distortion, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 631, 672 (1987) ("The 
opinion, in short, has no integrity."). But see Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 
79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1062 (1981) (praising Blaisdell). 
13. The effect of the Blaisdell decision was to obliviate the force of the Contracts Clause. See 
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1437 (1986) ("After Blaisdell, ... the 
contracts clause prohibit[ed] ... very little."); Epstein, supra note 12, at 738. In recent years the 
Supreme Court has begun to revitalize the Contracts Clause. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (Contracts Clause violated when the State of Minnesota retroac-
tively interfered with private pension plan). 
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I. A WALK THROUGH THE COURT'S OPINION 
This Part offers a sketch of both the Court's and the dissent's rea-
soning in Blaisdell. 14 Section I.A mirrors Hughes' opinion, discussing 
the police power doctrine, original intent, Contracts Clause precedent, 
and principles of construction. Section I.B discusses Justice Suther-
land's dissent. This Part also points out in passing several features of 
the two opinions which are significant to the investigation of interpre-
tive methods and the legal philosophies underlying them. 
A. Hughes' Opinion for the Court 
1. Police Power and the Factor of Emergency 
At the outset of his opinion, Chief Justice Hughes stressed that the 
police power of the states15 is intrinsic to our federal structure and 
constitutional framework. The economic emergency, Hughes thought, 
could not serve to justify the existence of the police power: "Emer-
gency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted 
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power 
granted or reserved."16 The opinion continued, however, by stating 
that emergency may justify the use, even if not the existence, of the 
police power.17 
Thus comes the first hint that the principle used to decide the case 
accommodates the social and political setting in which it arose; the 
existence of the Great Depression clearly overshadows Hughes' opin-
ion.18 As he put it, "[t]he Constitutional question presented in light of 
an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the particular 
exercise of it in response to particular conditions."19 In other words, 
different social settings require different interpretations of the Consti-
tution. 20 The Depression, presenting extremes in social conditions, 
justified extremes in interpretations of the law. 
14. Chief Justice Hughes' majority opinion was joined by Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, 
and Cardozo. Justice Sutherland wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by the other 
"Four Horsemen": Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, and Butler. 
15. Police power consists of "the residual prerogatives of sovereignty which the states had 
not surrendered to the federal government." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW§ 6-3, at 405 (2d ed. 1988). 
16. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425. 
17. 290 U.S. at 426 ("While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the 
occasion for the exercise of power."). 
18. See 290 U.S. at 425; 1933 Minn. Laws 339 at 514-15 (preamble); infra notes 84-91 and 
accompanying text. 
19. 290 U.S. at 426. 
20. See Corwin, supra note 11, at 313 ("[T]he emergency met by the Minnesota statute is not 
the same type of emergency which the Convention of 1787 had in mind, and for the simple but 
irresistible reason that the social environment has essentially changed since then."). 
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2. Original Understanding of the Contracts Clause 
Hughes freely conceded the point to which Justice Sutherland's 
dissent devoted considerable effort:21 the Minnesota Mortgage Mora-
torium is the kind oflaw the Contracts Clause was meant to prevent.22 
The Framers were responding to a potential crisis caused by the pas-
sage of debtor-relief laws during the economic turmoil of the period 
following the Revolutionary War.23 After acknowledging these facts, 
Hughes stated that the scope of the Contracts Clause might be nar-
rower than indicated by the Framers' intent: "full recognition of the 
occasion and general purpose of the clause does not suffice to fix its 
precise scope .... [T]he prohibition [against state laws impairing con-
tractual obligation] is not an absolute one and is not to be read with 
literal exactness like a mathematical formula."24 Hughes thought that 
some degree of impairment of contractual obligations is constitution-
ally permissible - regardless of the Framers' original understanding 
of the Contracts Clause. 
3. Precedent 
Early Contracts Clause precedent consisted of cases in which the 
Court struck down laws similar to the Minnesota Mortgage Morato-
rium. 25 In considering the applicability of these cases to Blaisdell, 
Hughes argued that "[n]one of these cases ... is directly applicable to 
the question now before [the Court] in view of the conditions with 
which the Minnesota statute seeks to safeguard the interests of the 
mortgagee-purchaser .... "26 Hughes had already stated that the 
Constitution must be read differently under different conditions. Be-
cause social conditions were different when earlier cases were decided, 
earlier reasoning might not be applicable to the current case. 27 This 
21. See 290 U.S. at 449-65 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
22. 290 U.S. at 428-29. The Framers' intent regarding the Contracts Clause is discussed in 
detail infra section 11.B. 
23. 290 U.S. at 427-28. 
24. 290 U.S. at 428. 
25. See 290 U.S. at 429-34; BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE CoNTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 68-76 (1938); Palmer, supra note 12, at 663-72. The Court first interpreted the Con-
tracts Clause in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), holding that the clause 
prohibited the repeal ofa land grant. In Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) 
the Court struck down New York's bankruptcy act because it applied retroactively to creditor-
debtor contracts. Shortly after Sturges, the Court invoked the Contracts Clause to prevent New 
Hampshire from altering a college charter. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The Sturges holding was limited in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 213 (1827), when the Court upheld a bankruptcy law enacted before a contract was 
made. The "classic case," WRIGHT, supra, at 69, on debtor relief laws is Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 
U.S. (1How.)311 (1843), in which the Court struck down an Illinois law, enacted in response to 
the Panic of 1837, that allowed mortgagors to repurchase property sold at foreclosure sales by 
paying the sale amount plus 10% interest. 
26. 290 U.S. at 434. 
27. 290 U.S. at 434. 
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raises the question of what precedent, if any, applies to Blaisdell. 
Hughes thought that the Court should look to cases holding that 
"the State . . . continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital 
interests of its people."28 In this vein, he cited cases holding that con-
tracts are subject to a variety of state interests. 29 "The economic inter-
ests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and 
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with con-
tracts. "30 The Contracts Clause does not, in this light, prohibit all 
impairment of contractual obligation.31 Hughes concluded that "[i]t is 
manifest from this review of [the Court's] decisions that there has been 
a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding 
ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public 
welfare."32 
Questions of precedent and construction thus seem to have had a 
special relationship for Hughes. When he cited McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 33 for example, perhaps he demonstrated obeisance to the Court's 
precedent, but to precedent subsisting in a realm beyond the confines 
of the Contracts Clause. Hughes used McCulloch as precedent not for 
a narrow and specific legal proposition, but rather to justify a mode of 
approaching and reasoning about constitutional cases. His method 
employs McCulloch as precedent of a special kind, using the case not 
for a rule of law that can be applied to the facts in Blaisdell, but rather 
for a principle of interpreting the Constitution. 34 As the next section 
explains, Hughes thought this principle could be legitimately applied 
in Blaisdell. 35 
4. Principles of Construction 
Hughes justified his open-ended construction of the Contracts 
Clause by stating that "where constitutional grants and limitations of 
power are set forth in general clauses, which afford a broad outline, 
the process of construction is essential to fill in the details. That is true 
28. 290 U.S. at 434. 
29. 290 U.S. at 440-42. The most prominent among these are the Rent Cases, in which the 
Court upheld rent control and housing statutes enacted in the wake of a post-World War I 
housing shortage. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feld-
man, 256 U.S. 170 (1921), and Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegal, 258 U.S. 242 (1922). Justice 
Holmes, author of these opinions, later confessed that they went "to the verge of the law." Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1923). 
30. 290 U.S. at 437. 
31. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (interpreting the Sherman Act's 
seemingly absolute restriction against combinations in restraint of trade to mandate a rule of 
reason prohibiting only unreasonable restraints of trade). 
32. 290 U.S. at 442. 
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
34. See infra section 11.C for an explanation of contextualism, the interpretive method sug-
gested by McCulloch. 
35. But see infra section 11.C. 
August 1992] Note - Legal Interpretation 2539 
of the contract clause."36 In other words, the Contracts Clause does 
not in and of itself answer the question of whether or not states could 
pass laws such as the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium. Hughes' 
claim implies that sometimes the Contracts Clause allows what it ex-
plicitly forbids: the impairment of contractual obligation. Hughes 
claimed not that the clause's meaning is unclear, but rather that its 
meaning cannot be made clear, cannot be understood, until the time 
comes when the Court needs to apply it. 
Hughes explicitly rejected the originalist position "that what the 
provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must 
mean to the vision of our time."37 Here Hughes quotes McCulloch v. 
Maryland: "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding."38 In the course of discussing principles of construction 
Hughes took issue with Justice Sutherland's argument that the "mean-
ing [of constitutional provisions] is changeless; it is only their applica-
tion which is extensible."39 It is not, the Chief Justice claimed, 
"helpful to attempt to draw a fine distinction between the intended 
meaning of the words of the Constitution and their intended applica-
tion. "40 For Hughes, an interpreter could not fully understand what 
the provision means until confronted with a specific case, and until the 
interpreter has considered the social and political background which 
the case presents. That is, a constitutional provision is not entirely 
meaningful until the time of its application. If the Court is not con-
strained by any abstract preconceptions of a provision's meaning, one 
must wonder what constraints the Court does endure.41 
B. Justice Sutherland's Dissent 
In his dissent, Justice Sutherland concentrated on the Framers' 
condemnation of debtor-relief laws. Sutherland had this to say about 
the Minnesota law's constitutionality: 
If it be possible by resort to the testimony of history to put any question 
of constitutional intent beyond the domain of uncertainty, the[ re is] ... 
no reasonable ground upon which to base a denial that the clause of the 
Constitution now under consideration was meant to foreclose state ac-
tion impairing the obligation of contracts primarily and especially in re-
spect of such action aimed at giving relief to debtors in time of 
emergency. 42 
Sutherland's argument is precisely opposite the one made by Hughes, 
36. 290 U.S. at 426. 
37. 290 U.S. at 442. 
38. 290 U.S. at 443 (quoting McCulloch, 11 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407). 
39. 290 U.S. at 451. 
40. 290 U.S. at 443. 
41. For the argument that the Court expressed this view with an eye toward freeing itself 
from the constraints of the Contracts Clause, see infra Part IV. 
42. 290 U.S. at 465 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
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that emergency conditions justify a flexible reading of the Contracts 
Clause. Sutherland's core position was this: what the Contracts 
Clause meant "when framed and adopted," it should mean for all 
time. 43 This originalist approach to the Contracts Clause44 invites a 
broad investigation of attitude and inclination, since there is no one 
clear indication of the Framers' intent to prevent debtor-relief bills,45 
Accordingly, Sutherland ranged far afield in his effort to establish 
that the Framers would have thought the Minnesota Mortgage Mora-
torium unconstitutional. He examined in detail the historical setting 
in which the Constitution, and specifically the Contracts Clause, was 
framed. He discussed not only the intent of the Framers of the Consti-
tution, but the attitudes and feelings of the day toward legislative in-
terference with private agreements.46 To this end, the dissent 
addressed the attitude of the participants at the state ratifying conven-
tions toward the Contracts Clause.47 Moreover, Sutherland exhaus-
tively detailed the dire economic conditions which existed after the 
Revolutionary War,48 and also discussed some of the ills caused by 
debtor-relief laws.49 While he could not make clear the Framers' spe-
cific attitude toward debtor relief, Sutherland concluded that the 
Framers would have thought the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium 
unconstitutional. As section II.B will explain, he was probably 
right.SO 
II. THREE METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 
This Part analyzes Blaisdell under three common methods of con-
stitutional interpretation. Section II.A explores textualism, explaining 
why, under a textual analysis, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium 
would be unconstitutional. Textualism is a threshold analysis; some-
times the meaning of a law's words when applied to a given set of facts 
is so clear that the mandate in that meaning must be followed if the 
law is to retain any force. In such cases - and this Note argues that 
43. 290 U.S. at 449 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Professor Brest cites this position as an 
example of a form of originalism he calls "strict intentionalism." Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest/or the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 204 (1980). 
44. Discussed in detail infra section 11.B. 
45. Justice Sutherland did cite a Luther Martin speech to the Maryland House of Delegates, 
which alone among recorded debate refers specifically to debtor relief. 290 U.S. at 461-62 (Suth· 
erland, J., dissenting); see also infra note 78. 
46. See, e.g., 290 U.S. at 464 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
47. 290 U.S. at 461-62 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 888 (1985) ("To the extent that consti· 
tutional interpreters considered historical evidence to have any interpretive value, what they 
deemed relevant was evidence of the proceedings of the state ratifying conventions, not of the 
intent of the framers."). 
48. 290 U.S. at 454-57 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
49. 290 U.S. at 458 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
50. See infra section 11.B. 
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Blaisdell is one - the interpreter ought not surmount the textual 
threshold and pursue other methods of interpretation. Nonetheless, 
an interpreter might move beyond the text of the Contracts Clause to 
decide Blaisdell. Section II.B discusses one method in which the inter-
preter considers a limited array of factors external to the text, namely 
originalism. Section II.C examines contextualism, a method in which 
the interpreter considers a wider array of external factors, weighing a 
case's impact on the federal and constitutional structure. Sections II.B 
and Il.C conclude that even when an interpreter considers factors be-
yond the text of the Contracts Clause, the Minnesota Mortgage Mora-
torium was unconstitutional. 
A. Textualism 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make 
any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass 
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.51 
Textualism posits that, at least in some cases, a provision's text 
offers a resource sufficient for the interpretation of the law, and resolu-
tion of the case. 52 In such cases, an interpreter need look no further 
than that text; only when the interpreter has confronted and sur-
mounted the threshold of ambiguous textual meaning should he seek 
interpretive guidance outside the provision's text. This section sum-
marizes arguments that text should be a controlling interpretive refer-
ent, and then subjects the Contracts Clause to a textual analysis, 
concluding that it does indeed prohibit mortgage moratoria. To bor-
row a phrase from Professor Frederick Schauer, Blaisdell is an "easy 
case."53 
As Schauer explains, in juxtaposition to Professor Ronald Dwor-
kin's attempt to explain how hard cases should be resolved, 54 not all 
constitutional provisions require a complex method of interpreta-
tion. 55 Schauer argues that "the nature of the language is an impor-
tant factor in separating the hard cases from the easy cases. " 56 That 
51. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (emphasis added) . 
.52. See Frederick F. Schauer, An Essay On Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797 
(1982) [hereinafter Schauer, Essay]; Frederick F. Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 509, 546-48 
(1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism] (discussing a theory of "presumptive formalism"). 
53 .. Frederick F. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); see also infra notes 
194-202 and accompanying text. 
54. Ronald M. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975), reprinted in RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1978); see also infra section 111.C. 
55. See Schauer, supra note 53, at 406-07 (explaining why some constitutional provisions are 
rarely, if ever, litigated). 
56. Id. at 406. 
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is, the "general intelligibility of language enables us to understand im-
mediately the mandate of numerous constitutional provisions without 
recourse to precedent, original intent, or any of the other standard 
interpretive supplements."57 If the Contracts Clause is such a provi-
sion, it is possible that an interpreter can tell what the provision means 
just by reading it, a possibility which Chief Justice Hughes denied. 
In a vein similar to Professor Schauer's, Justice Antonin Scalia ar-
gues that though no general principle contained in a constitutional or 
statutory provision can perfectly resolve all possible fact situations, 
even vague provisions can often be interpreted in furtherance of their 
underlying principles. 58 Where a constitutional command is more or 
less clear and categorical, one can, to a fairly great extent, articulate 
general rules based on it. 59 Moreover, where a judge is able to articu-
late such rules, he or she should do so; the alternative is for judges to 
"act[] more as fact-finders than as expositors of the law/'60 Thus, if 
the Contracts Clause is clear and categorical, the Blaisdell Court 
should have articulated and followed the cognizable and coherent 
command flowing from the provision. That is, were it easy to deter-
mine when a state law impaired contractual obligation, then the 
Court's analysis should have proceeded no further. 
The search for the Contracts Clause's meaning is fairly simple; as 
the following textual analysis reveals, the Contracts Clause is a provi-
sion of the clear and categorical variety. The obligation of a contract 
is the legal right or duty incurred by a party entering into a contrac-
tual agreement. 61 In the case of a mortgage, the mortgagor (the bor-
rower) has the duty to make loan payments, and the mortgagee (the 
lender) has the right to collect them. To impair something means to 
make it worse, or to "diminish [the thing] in quantity, value, excel-
lence, or strength."62 To impair the obligation of a mortgage contract, 
then, would be to relieve the borrower of the duty to make payments, 
and to take from the lender the right to collect them. 63 
The Blaisdell Court might have taken an easy way out of its quan-
dary by claiming that the Minnesota law affected not the obligation of 
a contractual agreement, but the remedy for the breach of one. Con-
tract remedies generally allow the victim of the breach to recover his 
57. Id. at 418. 
58. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 
(1989). 
59. Id. at 1183-85. 
60. Id. at 1187; see also infra Part IV. 
61. ARTHUR CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 2, at 3 (one vol. ed. 1952). 
62. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1131 (3d ed. 1986). 
63. See Bunn, supra note 4, at 251-52 ("Whether the impairment violates the Constitution 
may depend on other factors, but a substantial change in fact, by any form of law, of the real 
status of a party under an existing contract constitutes impairment."). 
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or her expectation, reliance, or restitution interest in the contract. 64 
That the Court did not discuss this option speaks to how plain it was 
that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium impaired the obligation of 
contracts. 65 The Act did not merely forbid the mortgagee to sue for 
breach of contract, but rather provided for the mortgagor's alteration 
of the mortgage note's payment terms. Had the Act affected only the 
mortgagee's remedy (rather than the contractual obligation due it) the 
law would not have provided for the dissembling of the mortgage's 
terms, but instead would only have rendered it unenforceable. 66 
Indeed, to impair the obligation - rather than the remedy - of a 
contract is to allow one party to breach, or partly breach, the agree-
ment. This is precisely what the Minnesota law did. In fact, under the 
moratorium it was the breaching party who was to go to the courts for 
relief. 67 Repayment terms were established to satisfy the breaching 
party, not the victim of the breach. 68 The trial court simply told the 
obligee (the financial institution/mortgagee), in effect, that its right to 
collect mortgage payments had been abrogated. 69 Thus, the Minne-
sota Mortgage Moratorium interfered with a privately created set of 
rights and duties - contractual obligations. The text of the Contracts 
Clause prohibits such interference.1° 
In summary, the Contracts Clause is unambiguous in its textual 
mandate, and the consequences of that mandate on the constitutional-
ity of mortgage moratoria are also unambiguous: the Constitution for-
bids them. The Court could only reach its Blaisdell result in spite of 
64. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACI'S § 12.1, at 812-14 (1982). 
65. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that "[a]ppellants 
[the mortgagor] concede, as they must, that chapter 339, Laws 1933, impairs the obligations of 
the mortgage contract." Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn., 249 N.W. 334, 335 (Minn. 
1933), affd., 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Moreover, the trial court in which the Blaisdells had applied 
for relief actually denied their claim, holding the law unconstitutional in light of the Contracts 
Clause. 249 N.W. at 335. 
It is also significant that the mortgagor did not raise, and no court considered, contract de-
fenses such as mutual mistake and impossibility. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 64, § 8.19, at 
624-26. There are several possible reasons for this. One is that the mortgagor - the party who 
would have raised the defenses - was the plaintiff at trial. See Blaisdell, 249 N.W. at 335. More 
importantly, however, is the fact that neither party was arguing that the contract at issue should 
be found unenforceable or void, or that any party should not have to fulfill its obligations under 
the contract. Rather, the debate was whether contract terms could be retroactively modified by 
the state, since that was what the statute provided for. 
66. See supra note 65. One could argue that such a law would not impair the contract's 
obligation, but such was not the Minnesota law, and thus this argument is beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
67. 1933 Minn. Laws 339, pt. 2, § 2. 
68. 1933 Minn. Laws 339, pt. 2, § 2; see also William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Mortgage 
Moratorium Act, 7 S. CAL. L. REv. 353, 370 nn.99-100 (1934). 
69. 1933 Minn. Laws 339, pt. 2, § 2. The mortgagor was still required to make some pay-
ments, usually reflecting the value of the mortgaged property, rather than the value of the 
mortgage. 
70. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 52, at 538 (arguing that no matter how it is formu-
lated, a rule's meaning is still clear; otherwise, rules could not exist). 
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the textual mandate of the Contracts Clause. Only interpretive meth-
ods which either disregard, or pay very little heed to, a provision's text 
could sanction this result. The next two sections discuss analyses that, 
under this Note's view of textual meaning as a threshold inquiry, 
should not come into play in Blaisdell because of the overriding clarity 
of the Contracts Clause. Nonetheless, both Justice Sutherland and 
Chief Justice Hughes sought to make their respective uses of these two 
interpretive methods, originalism and contextualism. 
B. Originalism 
Originalism rests on the theory that the Constitution's legal man-
date is informed by authority beyond its text: the Framers' intent. 71 
Originalism assumes that the Constitution has a static meaning, and 
that that meaning is fixed by the intention of those who framed and 
adopted the document. 72 The originalist thinks that legal texts are not 
by themselves dispositive of what the law is, looking also to the Fram-
ers' intent to fill those gaps in the law.73 This section attempts to de-
termine what the Framers intended with respect to the Contracts 
Clause. 
The Constitution's Framers did not extensively debate the Con-
tracts Clause. In fact, there is no evidence that either the Framers or 
the Anti-Federalists paid much attention to the clause.74 As a conse-
quence, though the originalist analysis of the Contracts Clause is not 
disabled by competing visions of the clause offered by different Fram-
ers, the lack of much concrete evidence about the Framers' intentions 
regarding the clause hinders the originalist analysis. Indeed, most 
commentators have had to engage in some amount of speculation to 
conclude that the Contracts Clause was intended to prevent debtor-
relief laws. 75 
71. Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 449 
(1984) (originalists conflate authority with objectivity). An originatist would deny that original 
intent is something external to the law, claiming that original intent is part of what the law is. 
See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 453 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (whole aim of construction is to dis· 
cover Framers' intent); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 6-7, 143-53 (1990) 
(discussing the neutrality of originalism); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981). 
72. BORK, supra note 71, at 149 (stating that originalism involves "find[ing] the meaning of n 
text" and thus implying that meaning is static and contained in the law from the moment of its 
conception); Monaghan, supra note 71, at 374-81. Justice Sutherland adopts this approach in his 
dissent. See 290 U.S. at 453. Sutherland articulated a view more extreme than that held by some 
modem commentators. Brest, supra note 43, at 204. 
73. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 71, at 143-60; Monaghan, supra note 71, at 374-81. But see 
Powell, supra note 47, at 888 (Framers intended structural interpretation of Constitution). 
74. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 5. 
75. E.g., A.H. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 
1067 (1933) ("There can be no doubt of the accuracy of the classic theory that the insertion of 
the [Contracts Clause in] the Constitution was a victory of the creditor class over their 
debtors."). 
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The Contracts Clause was first offered to the Constitutional Con-
vention by Rufus King of Massachusetts, presumably because the Fed-
eralists feared that state-enacted debtor-relief bills, many of which 
were aimed only at out-of-state creditors, would cripple the national 
economy.76 Indeed, "one of the principal causes for the dissatisfaction 
with the prevailing state of affairs under the Confederation among the 
well-to-do classes was the mass of legislation in the states which was 
highly unwelcome to creditors as it was popular with debtors."77 This 
dissatisfaction was not expressed on record at the Philadelphia Con-
vention, however; delegates there made no mention of debtor-relief 
laws.78 
The Federalist hardly clarifies the Framers' intent regarding the 
Contracts Clause. Although Justice Sutherland claimed that the 
clause "was strongly defended in The Federalist,"79 in fact it was only 
mentioned twice, and then almost in passing. Alexander Hamilton, in 
The Federalist Number 7, discussed the clause in the context of na-
tional unity: citizens of various states ought to be able to contract in 
other states without fear that legislative action will interfere with con-
tractual rights. 80 James Madison, in The Federalist Number 44, in-
cluded the Contracts Clause in an even more general discussion. 
Madison stated that, along with the ex post facto clause and the clause 
prohibiting bills of attainder, the Contracts Clause prevents retroactive 
legislative interference with items of "personal security and private 
rights."81 This might suggest that the Contracts Clause, like the pro-
visions it accompanies in Article 1, Section 10, should be read nar-
rowly. Still, The Federalist, while consistent with the originalist 
position that the Contracts Clause was aimed at debtor-relief bills, 
does not support the specific proposition that the Minnesota Mortgage 
Moratorium is precisely the kind of law the Contracts Clause is meant 
to prevent. 
One aim of the Constitutional Convention was almost certainly to 
prevent legislative interference with private property. 82 Furthermore, 
the Framers were concerned with retroactive regulation of private 
conduct;83 this is the purpose of the ex post facto clause, and it is no 
accident that the Contracts Clause appears with it and the prohibition 
76. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 8-9. 
77. Id. at 4; Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.). 
78. Wright, supra note 25, at 8; see also id. at 13 (quoting one of the few such specific state-
ments outside the Convention, a speech by Luther Martin to the Maryland House of Delegates). 
79. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 463 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
80. See THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
81. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 80, No. 44 (James Madison), at 282. 
82. Epstein, supra note 12, at 707; Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contracts 
Clause, 57 HARV. L. REV. 512, 512 (1944). 
83. See 290 U.S. at 464 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 
81, at 283). 
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against bills of attainder.84 All of these provisions prevent the state 
from retroactively interfering with private rights and duties. Unfortu-
nately, these general positions are easier to establish, but less useful, 
than the specific proposition that the Contracts Clause was meant to 
prevent debtor-relief laws. 
The Convention did not accept the Contracts Clause when it was 
first proposed. 85 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, among others, 
opposed it, "argu[ing] that such a provision would interfere with the 
passage of necessary legislation relating to the bringing of actions, laws 
thereby affecting contracts."86 A similar reason given for opposing the 
Contracts Clause was that "this would be carrying the restraint too 
far; that cases would happen that could not be foreseen where some 
kind of interference would be essential."87 In the end, however, these 
arguments did not prevail. 
When the Committee on Style produced its final draft of the Con-
stitution, the Contracts Clause had been inserted in Section 10 of arti-
cle I. The clause "was now accepted by the convention without 
question,"88 although no one has ever adequately explained why the 
clause was ultimately inserted in the Constitution after having been 
first rejected. One writer attributes the presence of the clause entirely 
to the committee's main draftsman, Gouverneur Morris, previous op-
ponent of the Contracts Clause, claiming that "he audaciously in-
serted" the provision after it "had been explicitly rejected by the 
convention."89 By this argument Morris inserted the clause merely for 
the purpose of giving "the Bank of North America the subtle protec-
tion it sought, by preventing the legislature of Pennsylvania from 
again revoking its corporate charter - which was legally a 
contract. "90 
In short, the immediate reason for the insertion of the Contracts 
Clause in the Constitution is unclear. Nonetheless, even if the Con-
tracts Clause is in the Constitution due to Morris' personal whim, 
commentators agree that most Framers intended it to prevent legisla-
84. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 81; WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 9-10 (Contracts Clause 
is in the Constitution because ex post facto clause was determined by the Framers not to apply to 
civil matters.). 
85. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 9-10. 
86. Id. at 8. Ironically, Morris may have been ultimately responsible for inserting the clause 
in the Constitution. See text accompanying infra notes 89-90. 
87. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 461. But see Feller, supra note 75, at 1067 ("(T]here is little evi-
dence to indicate whether the authors of the clause were aware of the extent of the restriction 
imposed."). 
88. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 188 (1913); see also WRIGHT, 
supra note 25, at 9. 
89. FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN RE-
PUBLIC 1776-1790, at 186-87 (1965). 
90. Id. at 187. 
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tive interference in private business.91 This general attitude might be 
sufficient to uphold the originalist position.92 This is particularly true 
if the analysis is confined to the question: How would the Framers 
have decided Blaisdell? 
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Sutherland agreed that the Fram-
ers would have thought the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium uncon-
stitutional. 93 And surely Madison's language condemning retroactive 
legislation speaks in negative terms about debtor relief. Madison, 
however, also spoke of hazards to the national unity caused by state 
laws interfering with the contractual rights of out-of-state parties.94 
Parties affected by the Minnesota law would almost all be Min-
nesotans. Thus, though it is much more likely than not that the Fram-
ers would have found the Minnesota law unconstitutional,95 the claim 
that this is precisely the sort of law they envisioned the Contracts 
Clause as prohibiting remains a little uncertain. 
C. Contextualism 
This section investigates the contextual approach to constitutional 
interpretation, pursuing two related issues: first, whether the contex-
tual method was what Chief Justice Hughes used in Blaisdell, and sec-
ond, what result the contextual method mandates when applied to the 
problem of mortgage moratoria. Essentially, the contextual approach 
takes McCulloch v. Maryland 96 as controlling precedent for constitu-
tional problems unresolved by a specific textual provision, and resolves 
them based on inference about the requirements of the federal struc-
tures and relations established by the Constitution.97 In McCulloch, 
for example, the Court reasoned that it must be unconstitutional for a 
91. E.g., WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 16. 
92. See BORK, supra note 71, at 163-65. For a deduction about the Framers' general attitude 
toward the Contracts Clause, see Epstein, supra note 12: 
There is very little reason to think that the framers had any theory about the contract 
clause, or pondered its implication to cases to which it could be applied .... [However,] this 
is not to say they would have rejected the implications once they were laid bare, ... [since 
they shared a] powerful conviction that trade and commerce were a social good, best fos-
tered by institutions that restrained the use of force and stood behind private commercial 
arrangements. 
Id. at 707. 
93. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 427-28 (Hughes, C.J.); 290 U.S. at 453-54 (Sutherland, J., 
dissenting). 
94. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 81. 
95. Note that the Framers' intent discerned in this section is narrow, applying only to a 
specific kind of state regulation. That the Framers meant to prohibit retroactive regulation of 
contracts does not mean they meant to prohibit all, or even most, state regulation of the eco-
nomic sphere. For example, it does not follow from the argument that the Contracts Clause 
makes the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium unconstitutional that the Court was right to engage 
in the sort of judicial activism embodied in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking 
down Bakeshop Act which regulated working hours and conditions in bakeries). 
96. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
97. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
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state to tax a national bank, because this would give a state the power 
to destroy the bank. To allow a state this power, and hence power 
over sister states as well as the national government, would be con-
trary to the federal structure established by the Constitution.98 Mc-
Culloch serves as a special kind of precedent for constitutional cases 
such as Blaisdell,· it offers not a proposition of law, but rather a model 
for interpretation.99 
To say, as did Chief Justice Hughes, that the prohibition of the 
Contracts Clause "is not an absolute one"100 immediately raises ex-
tratextual considerations; from a textual perspective, the prohibition is 
an absolute one.101 Hughes' idea suggests the possibility that textual-
ism removes the clause from its place in the meaning of the Constitu-
tion taken as a whole. Perhaps in Blaisdell this means looking to the 
federal scheme established by the Constitution, to the Contracts 
Clause's place in the Constitution, and to conditions in the society 
which the Constitution protects. Such an inquiry into the context of 
the Contracts Clause necessitates balancing a state's exercise of police 
power102 against the Contracts Clause. 
This balancing1o3 would focus on whether the state is reasonably 
exercising its police power, whether emergency conditions exist, and 
whether the state has carefully tailored its use of the police power to 
those emergency conditions. If the state's exercise of police power is 
reasonable, and does not violate the federal constitutional structure, 
then even a law which seems to violate the Constitution on its face 
could be upheld. Laws which impermissibly exceed the bounds of po-
lice power would be struck down. In theory, an interpreter who fol-
lowed Hughes' method would not be able to use contextualism as an 
unprincipled catch-all for justifying results. 104 
LAW 13-15 (1969); Powell, supra note 47, at 888 (Framers may have intended structural inter-
pretation of the Constitution.). 
98. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.), at 427-32; see also BLACK, supra note 97, at 15. 
99. See supra section I.A.3. 
100. Blaisdell 290 U.S. at 428. 
101. See supra section II.A. 
102. This inquiry is made all the more interesting by a consideration outside the scope of this 
Note: the police power is itself something that has arisen as an atextual concept within the 
framework of the Constitution. See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 6-3, at 405-06 (discussing the ori-
gins of the police power doctrine). The police power doctrine originally arose from structural 
considerations; the Court needed something to balance against a given constitutional provision. 
Otherwise, a given state practice - which seemed in itself worthwhile and harmless to the con-
stitutional structure - would have to be disallowed. See id.: see also supra note 15. 
103. For a discussion of what constitutional balancing entails, see T. Alexander Aleinikolf, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
104. Compare Blaisdell 290 U.S. at 445 ("In view of the nature of the contracts in question 
- mortgages of unquestionable validity - the relief afforded and justified by the emergency, in 
order not to contravene the constitutional provision, could only be of a character appropriate to 
that emergency and could be granted only upon reasonable conditions.") with W.B. Worthen Co. 
v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (striking down Alabama law similar in some respects to the 
Minnesota law on grounds that it was too broad and not adequately tailored to the emergency .at 
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If Blaisdell is indeed an exemplar of the method, then an inter-
preter could use contextualism to justify conflicting results. Perhaps 
Chief Justice Marshall endorsed this phenomenon when he stated in 
McCulloch that the constitution he was expounding was "a constitu-
tion intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 105 This would also 
explain how the contextualist could reach a result contrary to the 
Framers' intent; a court cannot know what the law is until the time 
comes when it must be applied. Implicit in the Blaisdell opinion is 
that, one hundred years earlier, the case might have come out differ-
ently .106 Conditions then may not have justified the use of police 
power, or, more likely, the Court simply read the Contracts Clause 
differently in past eras.101 
That Hughes cited McCulloch and that he sought to justify his rea-
soning in an atextual, nonoriginalist way does not, however, necessar-
ily mean that his was the contextualist method. In fact, the Blaisdell 
Court's reasoning departs from the contextual method of McCulloch 
in several important ways. First, in McCulloch, the Court's .decision 
was not based on any particular Constitutional provision. Moreover, 
the decision does not run counter to the facial meaning of any part of 
the Constitution's text. Finally, and perhaps most subtle, is the fact 
that the Court's reasoning in McCulloch was of a rigid, almost formal-
istic character, and could only be used to reach one result.1os 
When Chief Justice Marshall noted that the power to tax was the 
power to destroy, and that Maryland had thus appropriated a power 
over the federal government by taxing the Bank of the United States, it 
followed that Maryland's law (that the Bank was subject to a state tax) 
was antithetical to the federal structure and therefore unconstitu-
tional.109 In contrast to Hughes' analysis of the Minnesota law, Mar-
shall engaged in no consideration of the Maryland law's value, nor did 
he weigh that value against the law's contrariness to the federal struc-
ture; McCulloch's contextualism does not entail balancing.110 More-
hand; among other things, the Alabama law had no end date). But see Schauer, Formalism, 
supra note 52, at 530 (noting the danger that judges will fail to heed rules and instead follow their 
"rule·independent judgment"). 
105. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
106. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
107. See Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843) (striking down the Illinois mortgage 
moratorium enacted in response to the Panic of 1837); Sandalow, supra note 12, at 1062 (stating 
that Blaisdell represents "an evolutionary interpretation of the Contracts Clause" and suggesting 
that there is no "inviolable core of constitutional meaning"). 
108. See BLACK, supra note 97, at 29-32 (to suggest contextualist approach is not to suggest 
"that precision be supplanted by wide-open speculation"). But see Schauer, Formalism, supra 
note 52, at 535 ("A rule's acontextual rigidity is what makes it a rule."). 
109. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. 
110. See Aleinikoff, supra note 103, at 986 (balancing involves a fact-specific weighing of 
various interests). 
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over, unlike the Blaisdell Court, the McCulloch Court was not bound 
to analyze a state's ability to tax the Bank of the United States under a 
specific constitutional provision. 
The contextualism of McCulloch, then, is not atextualism, but is in 
fact a complement, or supplement, to textualism, to a reading of the 
Constitution's words. Although McCulloch may sanction interpreta-
tions of the Constitution that are not strictly based on the document's 
text, the case does not sanction interpretations of the Constitution that 
are plainly contrary to its text. Thus, Hughes overextended McCul-
loch's contextualism by using the case to justify opening the Contracts 
Clause to the sort of balancing analysis in which the Blaisdell Court 
engaged. 111 
III. BLAISDELL AND Two THEORIES OF LA w 
One cannot interpret a particular law without acceding, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, to some general theory of what law is. None-
theless, many interpretive problems are similarly resolved by different 
theories. To use a well-known example, 112 if a law says "No vehicles 
in the park," both an interpreter who looks to the law's purpose and 
one who looks exclusively at its text will agree that automobile drivers 
are prohibited from using the park as a thoroughfare. These interpret-
ers may disagree, however, over more subtle problems, such as 
whether a group of citizens may place a statue containing a jeep in the 
park, or whether a groundskeeper can bring a truck into the park to 
plant a tree. 
This Part offers an analysis of two theories, positivism and natural 
law, which could justify three methods of interpreting a constitution: 
textualism, originalism, and contextualism.113 This Part applies the 
two opposing theories of law to these methods, and examines how 
these theories would work to resolve the Blaisdell problem. Section 
III.A gives a brief introduction to positivism and natural law theories, 
and explains their relevance to Blaisdell Sections IIl.B and IIl.C fo-
cus on positivism and natural law respectively, and examine how ad-
herence to those theories might affect a judge's view of Blaisdell. This 
Part concludes that interpreters hewing to either theory would likely 
conclude that the Minnesota law was unconstitutional. 
A. Two Theories of Law 
As Part I demonstrated, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Suther-
land reached their opposite results via two very different approaches to 
111. See id. at 995. 
112. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
607 (1958). 
113. See supra Part II. 
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constitutional interpretation. If the law contained in the Contracts 
Clause is merely the text of the provision and perhaps also the mean-
ing ascribed to it by its framers, then one could read the Contracts 
Clause as a simple prohibition of the impairment of contracts. If, 
however, one thinks that not just the provision's language and the 
Framers' intent express the law that is the Contracts Clause, then one 
could think there is something more to the law than its words or fram-
ers' intent. The former view asserts that law can be given meaning 
before it is applied, and the latter that to give law meaning it must be 
put in context. 
The basic dichotomy in the approaches offered by Hughes and 
Sutherland in Blaisdell is loosely captured in a fundamental debate 
over the relation of law and morality between Professors H.L.A. Hart 
and Lon L. Fuller, identified with positivism and natural law theory 
respectively .114 Professor Fuller was concerned with the place of mo-
rality in law, arguing that one cannot tell what a law is (or means) 
until one has considered its moral content. Professor Hart claimed 
that law, though shaped by views of morality, itself has no moral con-
tent. Where Fuller would consider a wide range of factors in legal 
interpretation, Hart, though positing occasions on which these factors 
are legitimate fodder for the legal interpreter, would say that they have 
nothing to do with what the law is. 
The debate about whether law is separate from morality is impor-
tant to Blaisdell because the case raises this question: does an effort to 
interpret a law require any reference to moral (i.e., external), natural 
law concerns, or must it pay heed only to the positive command con-
tained in the law?115 Further, if reference to external concerns is legit-
imate, then how heavily should the interpreter weigh these external 
factors? 
At first blush, the Contracts Clause may seem to present few, if 
any, moral concerns. When Professors Hart and Fuller touch on the 
question of obedience to law under the regime in Nazi Germany, 116 it 
is not difficult to see that this question presents a moral problem. The 
Contracts Clause does not present a problem on this scale, but both 
positivists and natural law theorists would see a moral character to the 
Contracts Clause, as with every legal provision.117 
114. The debate originated in well-known articles published in the Harvard Law Review in 
1958. See Hart, supra note 112; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. R.E.v. 631 (1958). 
115. Hart stresses that external factors often need to be considered in interpreting law, even 
though they are not part of the law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 199-200 (1961). 
116. Hart, supra note 112, at 616-21; Fuller, supra note 114, at 648-57. 
117. Natural law theorists identify morality in, or as part of, law. See Fuller, supra note 114, 
at 644-48. The positivist would deny that there is a moral element in the law per se, but would 
agree that there is often a moral element in the action commanded or forbidden. See Hart, supra 
note 112, at 610-15. 
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The Contracts Clause has the moral aspect that all laws possess: 
the clause contributes to the ordering of the polity. 118 It renders pre-
dictable and smooth the machinations of commerce, and guarantees 
for our society orderly and reliable transactions. But the Contracts 
Clause also has a more specific moral aspect insofar as it protects ex-
pectations of the partjes to contract. In this aspect, the Contracts 
Clause rests on the moral maxim that parties should be entitled to rely 
on promises made to them. A central problem with the Minnesota 
law was that lenders relied on the sanctity of their mortgage contracts, 
but the law violated their trust. Another problem, however, was that 
which the law confronted. Economic conditions beyond farmers' con-
trol had deprived them of the ability to repay their mortgages. One 
can well sympathize with a mandate granting them some relief. 
Whether and how these moral concerns should affect an interpreter's 
legal judgment is a separate question, taken up in the next two 
sections. 
B. Hart and Positivism 
Sensitive to charges that positivism was nothing more than rigid 
formalism, 119 Hart stressed that interpreters must often look beyond a 
law (i.e., its text) to know how to decide particular cases.120 He drew 
a distinction between "core" and "penumbra[!]" legal problems.121 
Where there is a core of settled meaning, a law may easily and unam-
biguously be applied to a set of facts. No interpretive resource beyond 
the law's text is necessary. The logical deduction of textualism, how-
ever, cannot solve all interpretive problems. Penumbra! problems 
"arise outside the hard core of standard instances or settled meaning" 
- they arise, that is, when the interpreter is unable to determine what 
the particular words of the provision mean, i.e., when interpretation is 
not possible.122 Hart suggests that judges should decide penumbra! 
cases by openly legislating - by looking to the appropriate social, 
moral, and political factors and deciding how the case should come 
out.123 
118. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 717 ("Although the economic desirability of private con· 
tracts may at first glance appear far removed from the concerns of governance, the protection of 
private contracts against government regulation is inseparably entwined with two elements of a 
distinctly political cast: individual freedom, of which freedom to contract is but one illustration, 
and the need to prevent legislative misbehavior, itself a concern of any constitutional 
arrangement."). 
119. But see Schauer, Essay, supra note 52, at 812 (to say that text is authoritarian is not 
necessarily to adopt rigid formalism). 
120. HART, supra note 115, at 121-33; Hart, supra note 112, at 608-14. 
121. Hart, supra note 112, at 607. 
122. Id. 
123. See id. at 611-13. Hart's view is comparable to the legal realist's view that a judge 
should legislate when he or she encounters gaps in the law. See infra notes 171-80 and accompa· 
nying text. 
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Suppose for a moment that Blaisdell is a penumbra! case. Hart 
would posit that the Supreme Court possesses what amounts to legisla-
tive power to decide whether or not it should strike down the Minne-
sota Mortgage Moratorium. In this event, the interpreter can find no 
one right answer to the question of whether the Moratorium violates 
the Contracts Clause, because the provision is no longer in issue. The 
problem cannot be resolved with reference to it, and the case, being 
penumbra!, could reasonably come out either way. The Court could 
explicitly approve of the mortgage moratorium as a desirable public 
policy in light of the Depression (as Hughes must have done), or the 
Court could decide for some reason that the Minnesota law was so-: 
cially (that is, legislatively) undesirable, and reject it. 
Actually, an interpreter could characterize Blaisdell as a penum-
bra! case only with extreme difficulty. As section II.A argued, the 
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium represents a fairly standard and 
clear violation of the Contracts Clause.124 Further, as a general rule, 
penumbra! cases arise only when the situation giving rise to the case 
was unanticipated by the provision at issue (that is, by its authors).125 
The Framers of the Constitution probably anticipated Blaisdell. 126 To 
say that the severity of the Depression distinguished Blaisdell from 
standard instances, necessitating a penumbra! approach, would stretch 
the argument. Social conditions are irrelevant in core cases, because 
extant law suffices to decide them; they can only be considered when a 
case enters the penumbra! zone, where social policy considerations can 
fill a void in the law. 
Because Blaisdell is a core case, a judge deciding it cannot legiti-
mately appropriate any legislative leeway. In core cases, by definition, 
it is always clear what the law is. Here, the Minnesota Mortgage Mor-
atorium is plainly unconstitutional because it is clear on the face of the 
Contracts Clause that the provision forbids mortgage moratoria.127 
Blaisdell is like most cases in that it is a case in which an interpreter 
can honestly reach only one possible result after applying the law to 
the facts of the case.12s 
Hart describes the relation of morality to law like this: an individ-
ual may decide to obey or not to obey a given law for moral reasons, 
but the law itself is devoid of moral content.129 A judge is bound to 
apply the law that is, not the law that ought to be.130 In core cases, the 
124. See Palmer, supra note 12. 
125. Cf. "No vehicles in the park," discussed by Hart, supra note 112, at 607. 
126. See supra section 11.B. 
127. See supra section II.A. 
128. See HART, supra note 115, at 138-42 (discussing the risk that an interpreter will ignore 
the law and consider external factors when such a consideration is unwarranted). 
129. See id. 
130. Note that Hart's positivism perceives the duty of judges to follow the law not as an 
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judge has no option: it is clear what the law is. As long as he or she is 
bound by the law, 131 a judge is bound to the textual approach; this is 
the approach under which mortgage moratoria are most plainly un-
constitutional. The Contracts Clause would therefore constrain the 
positivist to decide Blaisdell in a certain way - reaching the same 
outcome as Justice Sutherland, even if not for the same reasons (in a 
core case a positivist would not care about original intent). 
In sum, a positivist would find it difficult to claim that Blaisdell 
was correctly decided. Still, other legal theorists might decide the case 
differently. Blaisdell demonstrates what might be positivism's disad-
vantage: it forces unjust (or at least undesirable) outcomes as the price 
of rigid constraints on decisionmaking. The Minnesota Mortgage 
Moratorium may well have been desirable social policy, but the posi-
tivist analysis of Blaisdell does not reach that policy. 
C. Fuller, Dworkin, and Natural Law 
1. Fuller 
In contrast to Professor Hart, Professor Fuller thought that a law's 
purpose was a part of its content. Accordingly, Fuller emphasized 
"the notion of order [which] itself contains what may be called a 
moral element."132 In this vein, Fuller discusses the "fabric of 
thought" necessary "to make the [law] a coherent, workable 
whole."133 His basic argument was that one cannot interpret and un-
derstand a provision of law such as the Contracts Clause, no matter 
how clear it seems when one first reads it, unless one pays attention to 
this "fabric of thought,"134 which consists of what Fuller called "pur-
pose and structure."135 He added that "[t]idelity to law can become 
impossible if we do not accept the broader responsibilities (themselves 
purposive, as all responsibilities are and must be) that go with a purpo-
sive interpretation of law."136 
Fuller's argument gains clarity when one considers his response to 
Hart's delineation of the core and the penumbra.137 Fuller found the 
distinction meaningless. He disputed the assumption "that problems 
of interpretation typically turn on the meaning of individual 
abstract moral duty but simply as the judge's duty under the law, as what is requisite if a legal 
system is going to be maintained and adhered to. See id. 
131. For example, a judge in Nazi Germany might not have been so bound. The problem of 
when or whether judges are ever not obligated by the law is beyond the scope of this Note, which 
assumes in all its discussions that judges intend to act within and according to the law. 
132. Fuller, supra note 114, at 644. 
133. Id. at 667 (discussing statutes); see also LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 
(rev. ed. 1964) (listing "eight distinct routes to disaster" in the making of law). 
134. Fuller, supra note 114, at 667. 
135. Id.; cf. BLACK, supra note 97, at 7. 
136. Fuller, supra note 114, at 670. 
137. See id. at 661-69. 
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words."138 His argument was this: there is no core. All cases are 
penumbra!. The concept of standard instances is meaningless because 
every instance to which words in a legal provision are applied occurs 
in a different context than every other instance. A word in a provi-
sion, taken out of context, "is almost as devoid of meaning as the sym-
bol 'X.' " 139 
This argument puts the Contracts Clause in a new light. It lends 
credence to Chief Justice Hughes' claim that one cannot know what 
the clause means until presented with a specific interpretive prob-
lem.140 Under Hart's view, the Contracts Clause, being narrowly 
drawn, would engender mostly core cases. And Blaisdell would al-
most certainly be one of these.141 Yet if Fuller is correct that cases 
typically do not turn on the meaning of individual words, then it is 
possible that a court deciding Blaisdell cannot help but take a broader 
look at the case. 
Fuller acknowledged the possibility that interpreters could abuse 
this open interpretive method, twisting a law in a way conflicting not 
only with its text, but with its purpose: 
One can imagine a course of reasoning that might run as follows: The 
statute says absinthe shall not be sold. What is its purpose? To promote 
health. Now, as everyone knows, absinthe is a sound, wholesome, and 
beneficial beverage.142 Therefore, interpreting the statute in light of its 
purpose, I construe it to direct a general sale and consumption of that 
most healthful of beverages, absinthe. 143 
Obviously, as Fuller says, this sort of interpretation, which his purpo-
sive method risks, ought to be avoided.144 · 
Perhaps the Court's reasoning in Blaisdell contains the abuse of 
interpretive discretion demonstrated by Fuller's absinthe example. 
Consider this argument: the Contracts Clause prohibits the impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts, but it does so because the Framers 
wished to promote social order and economic stability. The Minne-
sota Mortgage Moratorium was enacted for these same reasons. 
Therefore it must be constitutional. If this syllogism really does repre-
sent the reasoning of the Blaisdell Court, then even under Fuller's 
open-ended method the Court's opinion may be flawed. 
Fuller, wondering how to resolve the difficulty demonstrated by his 
absinthe example, is unable to give a precise method for determining 
138. Id. at 662. 
139. Id. at 665. 
140. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442-43. 
141. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. 
142. Note that absinthe is not really a healthful beverage. 
143. Fuller, supra note 114, at 670. 
144. See id. 
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when the purposive method departs from the acceptable contextual 
meaning of a law. He says that 
the answer lies in the concept of structure. A statute or a rule of com-
mon law [and, presumably, a constitution] has, either explicitly, or by 
virtue of its relation with other rules, something that may be called a 
structural integrity. This is what we have in mind when we speak of 
"the intent of the statute," though we know it is men who have inten-
tions and not words on paper. Within the limits of that structure, fidel-
ity to law not only permits but demands a creative role from the judge, 
but beyond that structure it does not permit him to go.145 
Fuller freely admits that his "purposive" search for the "structural 
integrity" of law amounts to a "common-sense" approach to interpre-
tation.146 One wonders why such an approach could not have pre-
vailed in Blaisdell. Even more than the absinthe statute, the Contracts 
Clause wears its purpose on its sleeve; common sense leaves no doubt 
about its facial purpose with respect to mortgage moratoria.147 
2. Dworkin 
Fuller's use of the word "integrity" is prominently echoed by Pro-
fessor Ronald Dworkin in Law's Empire. 148 Dworkin's general view 
of law is of "law as integrity."149 Dworkin's ideal judge, adjudicating 
a constitutional controversy, would look beyond the text to "a variety 
of considerations offairness and integrity."150 Dworkin is fond of say-
ing that it is the duty of a judge to make the law "the best it can 
be."151 To find "the best available interpretation [of the] American 
Constitution" and, presumably, provisions in it such as the Contracts 
Clause, Dworkin would consider "American constitutional text and 
practice as a whole," adding that the "judgment about which interpre-
tation is best is sensitive to the great complexity of political virtues 
bearing on that issue."152 Thus, Dworkin would seek a maximized 
combination of substantive interpretation and "fit" into the American 
constitutional fabric.153 
145. Id. Fuller echoed this argument - and justified its application in constitutional law -
in The Morality of Law. See FULLER, supra note 133, at 102 (stating that "interpretation can 
often depart widely from the explicit words of the Constitution and yet rest secure in the convic-
tion that it is faithful to an intention implicit in the whole structure of our government"); see also 
id. at 103 (approving use of the Contracts Clause to strike down laws that enhance the obliga-
tions of contracts). 
146. Fuller, supra note 114, at 670. 
147. Moreover, originalist analysis is consistent with this conclusion. See supra section II.B. 
148. RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
149. See generally id. at 176-275 (chs. 6-7). 
150. Id. at 380. 
151. E,g., id. at 53. 
152. Id. at 398; see also DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 107 (urging a theory of constitutional 
interpretation which "refer[s] alternately to political philosophy and institutional detail"). 
153. See DWORKIN, supra note 148, at 230-31. 
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In many cases Dworkin's theory suffers from the same shortfall as 
does Fuller's. One could use it to justify different results; even though 
Dworkin claims that right answers exist, he also acknowledges that 
different judges may decide like cases differently .154 This implies that 
either result might be the correct one, and that there are no "right" 
and "wrong" outcomes. Of course, there are cases in which, clearly, a 
judge could plausibly justify but one result.155 
In Blaisdell, however, overriding concerns of "fit" weigh against 
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium's constitutionality. Hughes 
may have been right that upholding the Minnesota law is consistent 
with the "growing appreciation of public needs and ... the necessity of 
finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights 
and public welfare."156 Nonetheless, striking the law down would 
have been consistent with previous Supreme Court Contracts Clause 
jurisprudence,157 (and Dworkin does give precedent significant 
weight158), the Framers' intent, 159 as well as society's expectations. 
Moreover, striking down the law would have been consistent with the 
provision's text. While in Dworkin's analysis text may be just one 
coequal factor of several that are to be weighed, here it would have to 
be weighed heavily because of the clarity of the Contracts Clause's 
mandate on debtor relief. 
The natural law approach, then, must either identify the correct 
result when contrary ones can be justified, or it must demonstrate that 
a method capable of reaching contrary results is valid nonetheless. 
Dworkin responds to the criticism: 
Law as integrity ... not only permits but fosters different forms of sub-
stantive conflict or tension within the overall best interpretation of 
law .... We accept integrity as a distinct political ideal, and we accept 
the adjudicative principle of integrity as sovereign over law, because we 
want to treat ourselves as an association of principle, as a community 
governed by a single and coherent vision of justice and fairness and pro-
cedural due process in the right relation .... [The ideal judge] is pre-
vented from achieving integrity viewed from the standpoint of justice 
alone - coherence in the substantive principles of justice that flow 
throughout his account of what the law now is - because he has been 
154. See, e.g., id. at 397 ("reasonable judges might disagree" as to the proper outcome of 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). This is not to bely Dworkin's rights 
thesis, which states that there are right answers in hard cases. See DWORKIN, supra note 148, at 
393·94; Dworkin, supra note 54, at 1058-60. 
155. See DWORKIN, supra note 148, at 389 (In deciding Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 
294 (1955), "[e]verything conspires toward the same decision."). 
156. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442. 
157. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 465 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (stating that "proof [that 
debtor-relief bills always violate the Contracts Clause] will be found in the previous decisions of 
this court" and then discussing Contracts Clause precedent); supra note 25 (collecting important 
Contracts Clause precedent). 
158. DWORKIN, supra note 148, at 240-50. 
159. Id. at 227 (discussing the role of history in law as integrity). 
2558 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2534 
seeking a wider integrity that gives effect to principles of f aimess and 
procedural due process as well. 160 
Dworkin argues that there is a level of integrity in law beyond sub-
stantive coherence; this "different, more abstract calculation" he calls 
"pure integrity."161 Dworkin has presented an abstract concept in-
deed, but it clearly displays one crucial aspect: like Fuller, a major 
factor in Dworkin's calculus is justice, "the right outcome of the polit-
ical system."162 
Assuming that such a thing as "pure integrity" exists, Hughes' 
Blaisdell opinion arguably fails to meet the standard. Given that the 
result reached in the case could not have "fit" less easily into either the 
legal landscape preceding it163 or conventional readings of the provi-
sion, 164 one must question whether any substantive outcome - no 
matter how desirable - could justify the Blaisdell result. Some may 
have felt in 1934 that the Supreme Court controlled the fate of the 
Republic, and some certainly felt that the Minnesota law was urgently 
necessitated by social unrest. 165 Nonetheless, a court could achieve 
the Blaisdell result only through a practical abeyance of the Constitu-
tion. Natural law theory justifies the Court's opinion only if one ig-
nores the fact that, as Part II demonstrated, the Hughes opinion does 
not fit into the fabric of American law. 
IV. BLAISDELL: EXEMPLAR OF REALISM 
The language of the law, wrote Jerome Frank, is the language of 
"rationalization," which is "the normal human way of avoiding recog-
nition of ... conflict."166 This Part argues that such was the language 
of Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Blaisdell While the Constitution 
mandated overturning the mortgage moratorium, political pressures 
and social need pushed the Court to uphold it. Section IV.A provides 
a sketch of legal realism, and section IV.B explains how realism ac-
counts for the Court's opinion in Blaisdell This Part concludes that 
the Chief Justice wrote an opinion that, seeming to reconcile the war-
ring demands of law and society, in reality only offered a false resolu-
tion of the conflict. 
A. A Thumbnail Sketch of Realism 
Like all academic trends, legal realism was a somewhat amorphous 
school of thought. Nonetheless, certain basic notions may be collected 
160. Id. at 404. 
161. Id. at 405 (emphasis omitted). 
162. Id. at 404. 
163. See supra note 25. 
164. See supra section II.A. 
165. See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text. 
166. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 30 (1930). 
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under the heading realism. 167 The theory had both descriptive and 
normative components. The cornerstone of its descriptive component 
was the notion that "law is ... what law does. " 168 This character of 
law is hidden because lawyers and judges frame their legal analyses as 
if they mirrored deductive logic; 169 yet in reality the law possesses 
"fluidity and pliancy."170 In a given case judges possess leeway to 
mold the law to produce a result to their liking. 
The consequence of law's inherent malleability, the realists 
thought, was that "[a] judicial decision is a social event."171 Jerome 
Frank proclaimed that ''judicial legislation ... cannot be avoided,"172 
and called the Supreme Court "a peculiar kind of political agency."173 
Karl Llewellyn went so far as to say that whatever "officials of the 
law .... do about disputes ... is the law itself."174 The realists 
thought that judicial decisionmaking filled the inherent gaps in the 
law.175 In sum, what judges do when they decide cases transcends 
interpretation of the law; inherent in the practice of jurisprudential 
reasoning is legislative decisionmaking. 
Furthermore, some realists thought judges should use leeway to 
make social judgments - policy choices - when confronted with the 
inherent ambiguity of legal language. Felix Cohen articulated the im-
petus for realism's normative component when he expressed his frus-
tration over the fact that lawyers and judges use legal concepts to 
obscure practical questions, and "forget the social forces which mold 
the law and the social ideals by which the law is to be judged."176 As 
Frank put it, "[m]uch of the uncertainty of law is not an unfortunate 
accident: it is of immense social value."177 If legal decisionmaking 
167. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism -Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1229-33, 1233-34 (1931) (realism is not a school, but rather is "a movement 
in thought and work about law") and 1236-37 (listing realists' common points of departure). 
168. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 91 (1951); see also Felix Cohen, Tran-
scendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809, 839 (1935); Llwel-
lyn, supra note 167, at 1236. 
169. See generally WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919). 
170. FRANK, supra note 166, at 6; LLEWELLYN, supra note 168, at 72 ("Of a truth the logic 
of law, however indebted it may be to formal logic for method, however nice it may be in its 
middle reaches, loses all sharp precision, all firm footing" when law is applied in practice.). 
171. Cohen, supra note 168, at 843. For the origins of the notion that law is rooted in social 
realities, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
172. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 315 (1949). 
173. Id. at 311. 
174. LLEWELLYN, supra note 168, at 12 (emphasis omitted); Cohen, supra note 168, at 840. 
175. More recent scholars have used a similar theory to justify some parts of constitutional 
law. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(1975). 
176. Cohen, supra note 168, at 812. 
177. FRANK, supra note 166, at 7 (emphasis omitted); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic 
Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 461 (1930) (discussing the "recurrent 
emergence" from law and society "of some wholeness, some sense of responsibility which out-
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really were an exercise in formal, deductive logic, where results ineluc-
tably followed from predicate propositions, then judges would be un-
able to shape the law to best serve the social good; law could not 
adequately respond to society's needs.178 
Though the realists lauded law's malleability, they did not neces-
sarily think this pliancy unlimited. In an appendix to Law and the 
Modern Mind entitled "Rule-Fetichism and Realism," Frank wrote 
that "[t]he will of the judge is to be directed to the just and reasonable 
results within the limits of the positive rule of law. " 179 Similarly, Llew-
ellyn wrote that realism urged "not the elimination of rules, but the 
setting of words and paper in perspective."180 That is, the abandon-
ment of a rule fetish is not necessarily tantamount to the abandonment 
of rules; even for the realists, the positive law imposed constraints on 
legal decisionmaking. 
Thus, though worlds apart in most aspects, realists and textual-
ists181 suddenly seem to share loosely one fundamental notion about 
the limits of legal interpretation. Like textualists, realists thought 
written law imposes some constraint on legal decisionmaking, even if 
the two camps would differ over the degree of the constraint. More-
over, Hart and Fuller both expressed similar views, agreeing that in 
most cases the law allows only one result. 182 And all of the commonly 
used interpretive methods presented in Part II take as axiomatic that 
rules exist and should be, in varying ways, followed. 183 What is signif-
icant is that the realists were not nihilists; they merely described how 
judges do and should work within the law, and did not advocate that 
judges work outside it. Thus, as the next section explains, while real-
ism can explain the result in Blaisdell, it may not condone that result. 
B. Blaisdell, Realism, and the Constitution 
Finding the realist explanation for Blaisdell is all the easier because 
Chief Justice Hughes himself gave a realist account of the Court's de-
cision when he claimed that the Contracts Clause was the sort of open-
runs enlightened self-interest, and results in action apparently headed (often purposefully) for the 
common good"). 
178. Interestingly, one proponent of this view was Professor Lon L. Fuller. See Lon L. 
Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 436-37 (1934) (book review) (overem-
phasis on technical factors in legal decisionmaking stigmatizes nontechnical considerations and 
actually makes legal decisions less rational and responsive to litigants than they would otherwise 
be). 
179. FRANK, supra note 166, at 281 (emphasis added). In a footnote, Frank summarized the 
similar views of other "free judicial decision proponents." See id. at 280 & n•. 
180. Llewellyn, supra note 177, at 453. 
181. Textualists urge adherence to rules though conceding that all rules leave some gaps in 
their mandate. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. 
182. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 133, at 102; HART, supra note 115, at 127. 
183. See supra section II.A (textualism); section II.B (originalism); section II.C 
(contextualism). 
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ended provision that left gaps which a court could fill according to its 
discretion in individual cases.184 Having made this claim, Hughes ex-
plicitly referred to the dire emergency presented by the Great Depres-
sion as a justification for the Court's decision.185 That the Court 
responded to the currents of social need is even more clear when one 
considers Hughes' statement that the Contracts Clause would not al-
ways permit mortgage moratoria.186 
Strong social pressures to uphold the Minnesota Mortgage Mora-
torium undeniably existed. The law was one of many pieces of mora-
tory legislation enacted with the onslaught of the Depression.187 It 
was passed after "a general outcry for relief" which included instances 
of mob violence and a march on St. Paul.188 This outcry had been 
prompted by a farm crisis resulting in "a constantly mounting wave of 
foreclosures and forced sales."189 Lenders were able to take advantage 
of farmers at foreclosure sales, paying paltry sums for what ordinarily 
would have been valuable property.190 
In short, were there ever a time and place in which debtor relief 
was justified, Minnesota in the early 1930s would have been it. 191 The 
Minnesota legislature enacted the mortgage moratorium for legitimate 
reasons and with a nondiscriminatory intent. Unlike post-Revolution-
ary War debtor-relief laws, with which states intended to protect their 
citizens against out-of-state creditors, the Minnesota law only regu-
lated mortgages in the state of Minnesota. Arguably the law was not 
intended to protect debtors at the expense of creditors, but rather to 
preserve and protect Minnesota's farm economy. That is, the law was 
intended to accomplish a legitimate policy goal. Moreover, the law 
was drawn so as to give creditors what the mortgagors could pay; it 
did not wholly abrogate (even if it did impair) the mortgagor's obliga-
tion on the contract.192 The mortgage moratorium was, in sum, justi-
fiable from a policy perspective. 
Given that Blaisdell's result was politically desirable, the question 
crucial to resolution of this Note's thesis is whether the relevant law, 
184. 290 U.S. at 426; see supra section I.A. 
185. 290 U.S. at 421, 425, 426. 
186. 290 U.S. at 425. 
187. See Bunn, supra note 4, at 263-65 (summarizing state moratorium laws). 
188. Prosser, supra note 68, at 355; see also Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 422-24 & n.4 (detailing the 
conditions endured by farmers during the Depression). 
189. Prosser, supra note 68, at 354. 
190. Id. at 354-55. 
191. Interestingly, the Blaisdells apparently did not argue that the mortgage contract should 
be unenforceable on grounds of public policy. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 64, at § 5.1. That 
debate shifted to whether the statute was justified by public need. 
192. Professor Prosser claimed that the law worked reasonably well - courts allowed pay-
ment plans that farmers could afford and that allowed lenders to recoup a reasonable part of the 
loan. Prosser, supra note 68, at 370 & nn.99-100. 
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the Contracts Clause, left room for the Court to engage in a policy 
analysis. Was there a void in the interstices of the law relevant to the 
resolution of Blaisdell? This question drives toward the problem of 
whether or not the Court's decision in Blaisdell exceeded the bounda-
ries delimited by the Contracts Clause, a positive constitutional com-
mand. These are questions almost any legal theorist would ask, 
understanding the word "positive" in a loose sense, denoting the com-
mon understanding among legal theorists that there are always some 
limits to the possible ways in which one may interpret a law.193 
Blaisdell's contravention of positive law may be demonstrated by 
comparing the case to the ever-familiar Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. 194 Brown 195 and Blaisdell 196 were both controversial when they 
were decided. While most commentators now support the Brown re-
sult, 197 modem scholarship has not been kind to Blaisdell 198 The 
cases are similar in that each case called upon the Court to make -
and it accordingly made - a judgment about a particular social pol-
icy. The cases differ, however, in that only in Brown did ambiguity in 
the relevant constitutional provision leave room for the Court to aban-
don neutrality in favor of a social policy. Brown is Blaisdell's extreme 
opposite in that, though both may be easy cases, Brown is an easy case 
because of textual vagueness, not textual clarity.199 
Admittedly, Brown was not regarded as an easy case when first 
decided; it flew in the face of decades of entrenched precedent.200 And 
Brown is not an easy case in the way Professor Schauer uses the term, 
because the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not dictate one 
clear, unimpeachable result.201 Nonetheless, Brown is an easy case for 
two reasons. First, because the relevant law (the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) is open-ended, from the standpoint of legal interpretation, it is 
easy to justify whatever result the Court chose to reach. Second, be-
193. See generally supra Parts II and III. But see, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRmCAL 
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1-2 (1983); ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW JN MODERN SOCIETY 241-
42 (1976). 
194. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
195. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 639 n.2; STONE ET AL., supra note 13, at 470-71. 
196. See Prosser, supra note 68, at 353. 
197. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 71, at 75. 
198. See supra note 12. 
199. This Note contrasts Brown with Blaisdell for the very reason that it is such a clear case. 
Harder cases that could still be contrasted with Blaisdell because of the ambiguity of the provi· 
sions they interpret include Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (wiretapping is not a 
search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state's 
regulation of coal mining was a taldng under the Fifth Amendment); see also Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (application of New York's Landmarks Preservation 
Law was a taking under the Fifth Amendment). 
200. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 357 (1896). 
201. See Schauer, supra note 53, at 408. But see id. at 406 ("Even if language were not a 
significant factor, other factors might yet serve to produce constitutionally easy cases."). 
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cause the Court was free to import moral and social considerations 
into its analysis, the case is easy to resolve given that racial discrimina-
tion is indisputably immoral. 
Brown is arguably faithful to, and certainly does not contravene, 
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.202 People may have thought 
that the Fourteenth Amendment either permitted or forbade the segre-
gation of schools, but they could not have thought this because of 
what the text of the document said on its face; the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not mention school (de)segregation at all, whereas the Con-
tracts Clause explicitly governs state impairment of contractual 
obligations.203 As in Blaisdell political need informed the Court's 
opinion in Brown. Chief Justice Warren declared that "[s]eparate edu-
cational facilities are inherently unequal" only after reviewing the so-
cial data concerning the education of the different races.204 Just as the 
Depression justified mortgage moratoria, the negative effects of segre-
gation on black school children justified desegregation. 
The crucial difference between Brown and Blaisdell, however, lies 
in the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment on its face does not man-
date segregated schools. Rather, the expectation (and fact) of segre-
gated schools existed because of the way in which the Supreme Court 
had interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment.205 Furthermore, the 
Brown Court made no attempt to reconcile its decision with conflicting 
precedent, but instead simply overruled it. 206 
Restated, then, the ultimate, crucial difference between Brown and 
Blaisdell is that in Brown there was an interstitial void in the relevant 
law, i.e., the Fourt~enth Amendment, that the nine justices of the 
Supreme Court, acting as judicial policy makers, could fill without 
rendering a result inconsistent with that law. In Blaisdell the Court 
had no such gap in the law at its disposal. As this Note has demon-
strated, from almost every perspective, the Contracts Clause con-
demns mortgage moratoria. This condemnation arises because every 
analysis confronts the clause's unavoidable stricture against the im-
pairment of contractual obligation. Were the clause vague or ambigu-
ous, a Court might find gaps allowing it interpretive leeway. But the 
202. BORK, supra note 71, at 76-77 (arguing that the result in Brown comports with not only 
the text but also the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment); TRIBE, supra note 
15, § 16-15, at 1477 (Brown was rightly decided because our conception of equal protection has 
changed, not because the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is different now than it was in 
1868 or 1896). 
203. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No state shall ... pass any •.. Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts .... ") with U.S. CONST. amend. 14 ("No state shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). 
204. Brown, 347 U.S. !It 495. 
205. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
206. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
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clause is clear, and no legitimate method of interpretation provides the 
leeway needed to support the Court's result in Blaisdell 
CONCLUSION 
To argue that Blaisdell was wrongly decided is not necessarily to 
make a claim that is broad in scope. Put another way, recourse to 
only the textualist method is not necessarily always, nor even fre-
quently, the only appropriate means to achieving right results. In 
cases where the law does offer a clear textual command, however, if 
that command is not followed then neither is the law. Inconsistent 
interpretations of text may, as Dworkin argues, retain coherence in a 
broad sense.207 And not all legal interpretations must be rigidly con-
sistent; however, inconsistent interpretations cannot maintain a coher-
ent legal system where only one interpretation is plausible. 
One might think, then, that Chief Justice Hughes was right to say 
that the Contracts Clause (and all constitutional provisions) should be 
read differently at different times. Indeed, one reading of Blaisdell is 
that the Court's opinion was wise, farseeing, and appropriate for its 
time. In Parts II and III, however, this Note employed a manifold of 
interpretive perspectives to demonstrate that Blaisdell's interpretation 
of the Contracts Clause is legally baseless not merely because it is in-
consistent with other substantive interpretations of the clause, but be-
cause the essence of the Hughes Court's opinion was to ignore the law. 
In Blaisdell, only one interpretation of the Contracts Clause was plau-
sible. Part IV augmented this conclusion by showing how the Court's 
holding would have been appropriate only if the Contracts Clause had 
left gaps for judicial legislation. Since the application of the clause to 
mortgage moratoria is clear, Blaisdell was rightly decided only if an 
interpreter may legitimately pay no heed to positive law. 
207. DWORKIN, supra note 148, at 404. 
